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THE COST OF GETTING LOCAL MONOTONICITY
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Abstract. In [15] Manfred Holler introduced the Public Good index as a
proposal to divide a public good among players. In its unnormalized version,
i.e., the raw measure, it counts the number of times that a player belongs to
a minimal winning coalition. Unlike the Banzhaf index, it does not count the
remaining winning coalitions in which the player is crucial. Holler noticed that
his index does not satisfy local monotonicity, a fact that can be seen either as
a major drawback [9, 221 ff.] or as an advantage [16].
In this paper we consider a convex combination of the two indices and
require the validity of local monotonicity. We prove that the cost of obtaining it
is high, i.e., the achievable new indices satisfying local monotonicity are closer
to the Banzhaf index than to the Public Good index. All these achievable new
indices are more solidary than the Banzhaf index, which makes them as very
suitable candidates to divide a public good.
As a generalization we consider convex combinations of either: the Shift
index, the Public Good index, and the Banzhaf index, or alternatively: the
Shift Deegan-Packel, Deegan-Packel, and Johnston indices.
Keywords: Public Good Index, local monotonicity, design of power indices,
solidarity, individualism, fair division
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1. Introduction
Consider a set of players who jointly make decisions under a given set of rules.
Here we specialize to simple games and subclasses thereof. Power indices address
the question of how much power collective decision rules, like a weighted (voting)
rule, award to each individual player: is player i more or less powerful than player
j, and by how much? For an example of an applied voting power analysis in the
EU, we refer the interested reader to e.g. [1, 6, 32].
Different power indices measure different aspects of power and there is still a
lot of research in order to answer the question which index to choose, see e.g.
[17]. For a recent overview of different power indices see e.g. [5]. Many of these
indices are based on decisiveness. A player is called decisive in a coalition if his/her
deletion in the coalition changes its status from winning to losing, so that the
individual is decisive or crucial for it. All power indices, the classical and the newly
introduced ones, considered in this paper are indeed based on counting different
types of decisiveness for players in coalitions.
Some particular rules, weighted games, specify that each player i = 1, . . . , n has
a specific voting weight wi and that a collective decision requires enough supporters
such that their total weight equals or surpasses a decision quota q. Let pi be the
power value assigned to player i by a power index. The power index is called locally
monotonic if wi ≥ wj implies pi ≥ pj , i.e., a player i who controls a large share of
vote does not have less power than a player j with smaller voting weight. Local
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2 JOSEP FREIXAS AND SASCHA KURZ
monotonicity is considered as an essential requirement for power measures by many
authors. Felsenthal and Machover [9, 221 ff.], for instance, argue that any a priori
measure of power that violates local monotonicity, LM for brevity, is ‘pathological’
and should be disqualified as serving as a valid yardstick for measuring power. On
the other hand e.g. in [16] it is argued that local non-monotonicity is a very valuable
property of a power index, since it can reveal certain properties of the underlying
decision rule that are overlooked otherwise.
Local monotonicity is an implication of the dominance postulate which is based
on the desirability relation as proposed by Isbell [20]. This property formalizes that
a player i is at least as desirable as a player j if for any coalition S, such that j is
not in S and the union of S and {j} is a winning coalition, i.e., is able to pass the
collective decision at hand, the union of S and {i} is also a winning coalition. A
power index satisfies dominance if pi ≥ pj whenever i dominates j.
Freixas and Gambarelli [10] use desirability to define reasonable power measures
and note that the dominance postulate implies local monotonicity. In this paper
we will consider the Public Good, the Banzhaf, the Shift, the Shift Deegan-Packel,
the Deegan-Packel, the Johnston index and convex combinations thereof. Since the
Deegan-Packel index [7], and the Public Good Index (see Holler [15]; Holler and
Packel [19]) violate local monotonicity, they also violate the dominance postulate.
Moreover, any violation of local monotonicity for the Deegan-Packel index implies
a violation of the Shift Deegan-Packel index (see [3]) and any violation of the
local monotonicity for the Public Good Index implies a violation of the Shift index
(see [2]). It is well-known that the Banzhaf [4] and Johnston [21] indices satisfy
the dominance postulate and therefore local monotonicity. If one or several power
indices violate LM then a convex combination with another power index, that does
not violate LM, yields a power index that also does not violate LM as long as the
weight of the latter index is large enough. To study how large this has to be is the
purpose of this paper.
Some works are devoted to verify the properties of dominance or local mono-
tonicity (among others) for some power indices and to show failures for some other
power indices (see among others, Felsenthal and Machover [8] or Freixas et al. [12]).
Other works are devoted to study subclasses of games for which a given power in-
dex not fulfilling local monotonicity satisfies it for such a subclass of games (see for
instance, Holler et al. [18] and Holler and Napel [16] for the Public Good Index).
Here we will also make a new contribution of this type, i.e., we consider two new
subclasses of games for which the Public Good Index satisfies local monotonicity.
The strictest generalization of local monotonicity is proportionality of power
and weights. For the classical power indices this property is satisfied for a subset
of weighted games only. Power indices which generally satisfy this property are
constructed in [22].
This paper starts by modifying the Public Good index with the purpose to
achieve a new power index being local monotonic and more solidary than the
Banzhaf index. These two properties make those achievable power indices (if they
exist) well-situated as yardstick for doing a fair division of a public good. The idea
of such modification is nothing else than an hybrid between the original Public
Good index and the Banzhaf index. It will turn out that the cost of obtaining local
monotonicity is rather high, i.e., the achievable new indices satisfying local mono-
tonicity are closer to the Banzhaf index than to the Public Good index. However
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these indices stress more in minimal winning coalitions, as the Public Good index
does, than in the rest of crucial winning coalitions, with goes in the direction of
Riker’s size principle, see [31]. The final result permits to find new indices being
locally monotonic and being more solidary than the Banzhaf index, which makes
them as good alternatives for the fair division of a public good among participants
in the voting procedure.
The idea developed previously naturally extends when the raw Shift index is
incorporated to the duo formed by the raw Public Good and raw Banzhaf indices.
Local monotonic indices which are convex combinations of the three given raw
indices are a further target of our research.
As an extension we do a similar study for convex combinations of the raw John-
ston index, the raw Deegan-Packel index, and the raw Shift Deegan-Packel index.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we intro-
duce the basic notation of games and power indices. Two subclasses of weighted
games satisfying local monotonicity are presented in Section 3. The concept of
considering convex combinations of some power indices as a new power index is
outlined in Section 4. The cost of local monotonicity is introduced in the same
section. Additionally we prove some structural results. An integer linear program-
ming approach to compute the cost of local monotonicity is presented in Section 5.
With the aid of the underlying algorithm we are able to state some exact values and
lower bounds for the cost of local monotonicity in Section 6. The set of all convex
multipliers leading to a locally monotonic power index is the topic of Section 7. We
end with a conclusion in Section 8.
2. Notation, games and indices
In the following we will denote the set of players, which jointly make a decision,
by N and assume w.l.o.g. that the players are numbered from 1 to n, i.e., N =
{1, . . . , n}. Here we restrict ourselves to binary decisions, i.e., each player can
either vote 1, meaning ‘yes’, or 0, meaning ‘no’, on a certain issue. We call a subset
S ⊆ N , collecting the ‘yes’-voters, coalition. A (binary) decision rule is formalized
as a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} from the set of possible coalitions to the set of
possible aggregated decisions. It is quite natural to require that the aggregated
decision transfers the players decision if they all coincide and that an enlarged set
of supporters should not turn the decision from yes to no:
Definition 1. A simple game is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(∅) = 0,
v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
Having local monotonicity in mind we additionally require that the players are
linearly ordered according to their capabilities to influence the final group deci-
sion. This can be formalized, as already indicated in the introduction, with the
desirability relation introduced in [20].
Definition 2. We write i A j (or j @ i) for two players i, j ∈ N of a simple game
v if we have v
(
{i} ∪ S\{j}
)
≥ v(S) for all {j} ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} and we abbreviate
i A j, j A i by ij.
In words we say that i dominates j for i A j and we call i and j equivalent iff
ij.
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Definition 3. A simple game v is called complete if the binary relation A is a
total preorder, i.e.,
(1) i A i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) i A j or j A i for all i, j ∈ N , and
(3) i A j, j A h implies i A h for all i, j, h ∈ N .
We call a coalition S of a simple game v winning if v(S) = 1 and losing otherwise.
Each simple game is uniquely characterized by its set W of winning coalitions (or
its set L of losing coalitions). A winning coalition S such that each of its proper
subsets is losing is called a minimal winning coalition. The set M of minimal
winning coalitions is already sufficient to uniquely characterize a simple game. For
complete simple games the defining set of winning coalitions can be further reduced.
A minimal winning coalition S is called shift-minimal if for each pair of players i,
j with i ∈ S, j /∈ S, i A j, j 6A i we have v(S\{i}∪ {j}) = 0, i.e., replacing a player
by a (properly) dominated player turns the coalition into a losing one. With this,
each complete simple game is uniquely characterized by its set S of shift-minimal
winning coalitions.
A very transparent form of dominance is induced by weights.
Definition 4. A simple game v is called weighted (weighted game for brevity) if
and only if there exist weights wi ∈ R≥0, for all i ∈ N , and a quota q ∈ R>0 such
that v(S) = 1 is equivalent to w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q for all S ⊆ N .
Given such a weighted representation we write v = [q;w1, . . . , wn]. All weighted
games are complete. As remarked before wi ≥ wj implies that player i dominates
player j, i.e., i A j, while ij is still possible even for wi > wj .
In order to measure the influence of the players we use the concept of a power
index, which we in general consider as a mapping from a set G of games to a vector
of n real numbers, where n is the number of players of the specific game. In most
applications, considering subsets of the set of simple games, the image is a vector
of n non-negative real numbers upper bounded by 1. To this end we denote by S
the set of simple games, by C the set of complete simple games, and by W the set
of weighted games. In order to stress the underlying class of games, we speak of a
power index P on G, whenever it is not clear from the context.
In some contexts it is appropriate to further restrict the class of games:
Definition 5. A simple game is called proper if the complement N\S of any
winning coalition S is losing. It is called strong if the complement N\S of any
losing coalition S is winning. A simple game that is both proper and strong is
called constant-sum (or self-dual, or decisive).
We will denote the restriction to proper, strong, or constant-sum games by a
superscript p, s, and c, respectively, i.e., we write Sp, Ss, and Sc in the case of
simple games. If P is a power index on G, then there is a restricted power index
P ′ on G′ for all G′ ⊆ G,
Having the general concept of a power index P on G at hand, i.e., P (v) =
(P1(v), . . . , Pn(v)) = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn, we can define the properties that we are
interested in this paper:
Definition 6. A power index P on G ⊆ C satisfies the dominance property if we
have pi ≥ pj for all complete simple games v ∈ G and all pairs of players i A j,
where P (v) = (p1, . . . , pn).
THE COST OF GETTING LOCAL MONOTONICITY 5
Restricting the dominance property from the class of complete simple games to
weighted games, we speak of local monotonicity.
Definition 7. A power index P on G ⊆ W satisfies local monotonicity (LM) if
we have pi ≥ pj for all weighted games v ∈ G and all pairs of players i A j (or
wi ≥ wj), where P (v) = (p1, . . . , pn).
We remark that the dominance property for the subclass of weighted games
implies local monotonicity and local monotonicity implies symmetry, i.e., we have
pi = pj for all ij. Further properties of classical power indices where named
and studied in the literature, e.g., if all pi’s are non-negative and sum up to one
the power index is called efficient. If pi = 0 for all players i not contained in
any minimal winning coalition, also called null players or nulls, then the power
index is said to satisfy the null player property. Removing a null player from a
simple game (complete simple game or weighted game) v results in a simple game
(complete simple game or weighted game) v′ – more formally v′ := 2N\{i} → {0, 1}
v′(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N\{i}. If pj = p′j for all j ∈ N\{i} and pi = 0, where
P (v) = (p1, . . . , pn) and P (v
′) = (p′1, . . . , p
′
i−1, p
′
i+1, . . . , p
′
n), we call P invariant for
nulls. We call a power index strictly positive if pi > 0 for all non-null players i and
pj = 0 for all null players j.
In order to state the definition for the set of power indices mentioned in the
introduction we call a winning coalition S decisive for player i ∈ S if S\{i} is
losing. Given a simple game v, by Di we denote the set of coalitions {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N
being decisive for player i. Similarly, we denote by Mi the set of minimal winning
coalitions containing player i and by Si the set of shift-minimal winning coalitions
containing player i (provided that the game is complete). In order to specify a
power index P it suffices to define the mapping for each coordinate Pi(v) = pi.
Definition 8. The (raw) Banzhaf index Bzr and the (raw) Public Good index PGIr
of a simple game v are given by Bzri (v) = |Di| and PGIri (v) = |Mi|. The (raw)
Shift index of a complete simple game v is given by Sri (v) = |Si|.
The (raw) Banzhaf index Bzr, the (raw) Public Good index PGIr, and the
(raw) Shift index Sr all are based on decisive coalitions since they count subsets
of decisive coalitions containing a given player i. The Banzhaf index counts all
decisive coalitions for each player, while the Public Good index counts only the
minimal and the Shift index only the shift-minimal ones. Thus, for each player we
have the inclusion
Si ⊆Mi ⊆ Di.
Counting a certain subset of coalitions is the base for many power indices, see e.g.
[27] for further examples. As defined several coalitions can be counted multiple
times, i.e., a minimal winning coalition S is counted for every player i contained in
S in the computation of PGIr. If one wants to avoid this characteristic and instead
count each distinguished coalition just once, then one can divide ‘spoils’ of each
coalition equally among its decisive members. This general construction is called
equal division version of a given power index (based on counting functions) in [27].
Applying this construction on our first set of power indices we obtain the second
set:
Definition 9. The (raw) Johnston index Jor and the (raw) Deegan-Packel index
DPr of a simple game v are given by Jori (v) =
∑
S∈Di
1
# decisive players in S and
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DPri (v) =
∑
S∈Mi
1
|S| . The (raw) Shift Deegan-Packel index of a complete simple
game v is given by SDPri (v) =
∑
S∈Si
1
|S| .
Note that in the two last definitions |S| = # decisive players in S, since all
players in minimal winning (or in shift-minimal winning) coalitions are decisive in
them.
3. Two subclasses where the Public Good and the Deegan-Packel
satisfy local monotonicity
As it is well-known the the Banzhaf and the Johnston indices (and the Shapley-
Shubik too) satisfy both the dominance property and local monotonicity since all
of them preserve the desirability relation (see e.g. [12]). The other power indices
previously introduced in Section 2 and extensively analyzed in this paper do not
preserve the desirability relation and consequently fail to fulfill both the dominance
and the local monotonicity properties.
The purpose of this section is to provide subclasses of games, not introduced
before, satisfying the dominance property or the local-monotonicity for the Public
Good and the Deegan-Packel indices. As seen below the cost for one of these two
power indices to satisfy the local monotonicity property for a given game is related
to the proximity or remoteness of the game to be in these subclasses.
Definition 10. A simple game is:
(1) uniform if all minimal winning coalitions have the same cardinality,
(2) uniformly complete if it is both complete and uniform,
(3) uniformly weighted if it is both weighted and uniform.
As an abbreviation we denote the corresponding subclasses by U, Uc, and Uw,
respectively. Obviously, a uniformly weighted game is a uniformly complete game
and a uniformly complete game is a uniform game, while the converses are not true.
The second observation is that if a game is uniform then all shift-minimal winning
coalitions have the same cardinality because S ⊆M for all simple game. However
the converse is also true, i.e., if all shift-minimal winning coalitions have the same
cardinality then all the minimal winning coalitions have the same cardinality too.
This is because the coalitions inM\S are obtained from those in S by one-to-one
replacements of weaker players, according to the desirability relation, for stronger
players; but these exchanges do not affect the cardinalities of the coalitions involved.
Hence, we can exchange in previous definition the term “minimal winning coalition”
by “shift-minimal winning coalition”.
If l is the cardinality of all minimal winning coalitions in a uniform game, in any
of its forms, then M =M(l) where M(l) is the set of minimal winning coalitions
of cardinality l.
Proposition 1. Let v be a uniform complete simple game, characterized by W and
N , then the Public Good and Deegan-Packel indices satisfy the dominance property.
Proof. Since DP ri = PGI
r
i /l for all i ∈ N , where l = min{|S| : S ∈ W}, it
suffices to prove the statement for the Public Good index.
Assume i A j, then for all S ⊆ N \{i, j} with S∪{j} ∈ M we have S∪{i} ∈ W.
If S∪{i} /∈M, then there would exist a player k ∈ S such that (S∪{i})\{k} ∈ W,
but |(S ∪ {i}) \ {k}| = |S ∪ {j}| − 1 = l − 1, which is a contradiction with the fact
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that all minimal winning coalitions have the same size. Thus, S ∪ {i} ∈ M and
therefore PGIri = |Mi| ≥ |Mj | = PGIrj . 
We remark that i A j, i 6A j even implies PGIri > PGIrj .
Corollary 1. The Public Good and Deegan-Packel indices satisfy dominance and
local monotonicity properties on the classes Uc and Uw, respectively.
As a consequence, for uniform complete simple games the ranking given by the
desirability relation coincides with the rankings given by Public Good and Deegan-
Packel indices. So these ranking also coincide with the rankings of the Shapley-
Shubik, Banzhaf, and Johnston indices, see [12].
Despite the restrictive definition of uniform complete simple games, their number
is large. For instance, there are (see e.g. [14, 29]) 2n − 1 uniform complete simple
games with just one type of shift-minimal winning coalitions of n voters. Table 1
provides enumerations for small values of n on the number of uniform complete
games (Uc) and uniform weighted games (Uw). For n = 10 players the number of
uniform complete simple games is given by 3 049 712 101 and for n = 11 players the
respective number larger than 25 ·1012. Without considering symmetry the number
of uniform simple games with n players is given by
n∑
k=1
2(
n
k)−1.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Uc 1 3 7 16 41 140 843 14 434 1 410 973
Uw 1 3 7 16 41 125 458 2 188 20 079
Table 1. Number of uniform complete simple games and uniform
weighted games.
Being a uniform game is a sufficient condition for both the Public Good and
the Deegan-Packel index to be local monotonic. However, this condition is not
necessary as the following example illustrates.
Example 1. Let v be the 4-person game uniquely characterized by N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
and M = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {2, 3, 4}}, i.e., v admits the weighted representation
[3; 2, 1, 1, 1]. This game is the unique weighted game of 4 voters which is not uniform
but it satisfies the dominance property for the Public Good index.
At the very least, this game is captured by the following two definitions.
Definition 11. Let v be a simple game with player set N = {1, . . . , n} and
i % j if and only if
k∑
l=1
|Mi(l)| ≥
k∑
l=1
|Mj(l)| for all k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then % is a preordering on N , i.e., a reflexive and transitive relation, called the
layer relation.
Definition 12. A simple game v on N is flat whenever %, the layer relation on
N , is total.
Thus, in a flat simple game, we either have i % j or j % i for all i, j ∈ N . Let F
be the class of flat games.
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Proposition 2. Let v be a flat complete simple game then the Public Good and
Deegan-Packel indices satisfy the dominance property.
Proof. Assume i A j and let k ≤ n− 2 be the maximal integer such that
{S ⊆ N\{i, j} : S ∪ {i} ∈ M, |S| = k} = {S ⊆ N\{i, j} : S ∪ {j} ∈ M, |S| = k} .
With this we have
∑l
h=1Mi(h) =
∑l
h=1Mj(h) for all l ≤ k + 1. Now let S ⊆
N\{i, j} be a coalition of cardinality k+ 1. If S ∪ {j} ∈ M, then S ∪ {i} ∈ W and
S′ ∪ {j} /∈ M for all S′ ( S. Due to the definition of k we have S′ ∪ {i} /∈ M for
all S′ ( S and conclude S ∪ {i} ∈ M. Using the definition of k again, we conclude∑k+2
h=1Mi(h) =
∑k+2
h=1Mj(h) or k = m− 2, i.e., we must have i % j.
Since PGIri =
∑n
l=1 |Mi(l)| ≥
∑n
l=1 |Mj(l)| = PGIrj the statement is true for
the public Good index.
Since DPri =
1
l
∑n
l=1 |Mi(l)| we have the decomposition
(1)
DPri −DPrj =
(
1− 12
) (∑1
l=1 |Mi(l)| −
∑1
l=1 |Mj(l)|
)
+(
1
2 − 13
) (∑2
l=1 |Mi(l)| −
∑2
h=1 |Mj(l)|
)
+
· · ·+(
1
n−1 − 1n
)(∑n−1
l=1 |Mi(l)| −
∑n−1
h=1 |Mj(l)|
)
+
1
n (
∑n
h=1 |Mi(l)| −
∑n
h=1 |Mj(l)|) .
Since v is flat, each addend is non-negative, i.e., DPri ≥ DPrj .

We remark that i A j, i 6A j even implies DPri > DPrj . Note further that uniform
games are particular cases of flat games.
Example 2. Let v be the weighted game uniquely characterized by N = {1, 2, 3}
and M = {{1}, {2, 3}}. This is a flat game with 1 A 2, 2 6A 1, and 23. The
(normalized) Public Good index is given by 13 · (1, 1, 1), i.e., player 1 and player 2
obtain the same value while not being equivalent. The (normalized) Deegan-Packel
index is given by 14 · (2, 1, 1).
Corollary 2. The Public Good and Deegan-Packel indices satisfy local monotonic-
ity for weighted flat games.
4. Convex combinations of power indices and the cost of local
monotonicity
As mentioned in the introduction the aim of this paper is to study power indices
arising as a convex combination of a given (finite) collection of power indices. To
this end let P be a finite set of power indices, e.g. P = {Bzr,PGIr} or P =
{Bzr,PGIr,Sr}, which we will use later on. Given a set P = {P 1, . . . , P r} of
power indices we consider the convex combinations
Pα,P =
r∑
i=1
αi · P i,
where α = (α1, . . . , αr) ∈ [0, 1]r and
∑r
i=1 αi = 1, that is α belongs to the r-
dimensional simplex. For brevity we write α ∈ Sr. The power indices P i are
defined on possibly different classes Gi and we set G = ∩ri=1Gi. Obviously Pα,P is
a power index on G too, i.e., it maps games in G to a vector in Rn. In the remaining
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part of the paper we will not explicitly mention the underlying classes Gi and G of
games.
Convex combinations of power indices have the nice feature that they preserve
the properties for power indices defined in Section 2.
Lemma 1. Let P = {P 1, . . . , P r} be a collection of power indices such that P j
(1) satisfies the null player property,
(2) is symmetric,
(3) is strictly positive,
(4) is efficient,
(5) has the dominance property,
(6) is local monotonic, or
(7) is invariant for nulls
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ r, then Pα,P , where α ∈ Sr, has the same property.
Proof. For properties (1)-(3) the statement directly follows from the definition.
For property (4) we have
n∑
i=1
P ji (v) = 1
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ r. With this we conclude
n∑
i=1
Pα,Pi (v) =
n∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
αj · P ji (v) =
r∑
j=1
αj ·
n∑
i=1
P ji (v) =
r∑
j=1
αj = 1,
using the fact that the αj sum up to one.
For properties (5) and (6) we consider players i and h such that P ji (v) ≥ P jh(v)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ r. With this we have
Pα,Pi (v) =
r∑
j=1
αj · P ji (v) ≥
r∑
j=1
αj · P jh(v) = Pα,Ph (v),
since the αj are non-negative.
If the P j are invariant for nulls, then they have to satisfy the null player property.
From (1) we deduce that Pα,P also satisfies the null player property. Thus it suffices
to prove Pα,Pi (v) = P
α,P
i (v
′) for every player i and every game v′ arising from v
by deleting an arbitrary null player. We have
Pα,Pi (v) =
r∑
j=1
αj · P ji (v) =
r∑
j=1
αj · P ji (v′) = Pα,Pi (v′),
so that the statement is also true for property (7). 
In this paper we are especially interested in the case where not all but at least
one power index of a collection
{
P 1, . . . , P r
}
satisfies local monotonicity. W.l.o.g.
we assume r ≥ 2 and that P 1 satisfies local monotonicity while the other indices
might or might not satisfy LM. The convex combinations Pα,P may or may not
satisfy LM, depending on α. At least for α = (1, 0, . . . , 0) LM is satisfied.
Definition 13. Let G ⊆ W be a class of weighted games, n ∈ N>0 and P ={
P 1, . . . , P r
}
be a collection of power indices on G such that P 1 satisfies local
monotonicity. By PPLM(n,G) we denote the set of α ∈ Sr such that Pα,P satisfies
LM on the set of games of G consisting of n players.
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Lemma 2. Given the requirements of Definition 13, the set PPLM(n,G) is a non-
empty (bounded) polyhedron.
Proof. Obviously, we have PPLM(n,G) ⊆ Sr. Given a game v ∈ G and two players
1 ≤ i, j ≤ n with i A j, we have Pα,Pi (v) ≥ Pα,Pj (v) if and only if Pα,Pi (v) −
Pα,Pj (v) ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
(2)
r∑
h=1
αh ·
(
Phi (v)− Phj (v)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈[0,1]
≥ 0.
Thus PPLM(n,G) is given as the intersection of Sr and the half-spaces (and possibly
Rr for trivial inequalities 0 ≥ 0) described by Inequality (2) for all v ∈ G consisting
of n players and all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n with i A j. We have G ⊆ W ⊆ S, so that the
number of n-player games of G is upper bounded by the number of simple games
consisting of n players. Since each simple game is uniquely characterized by its set
of winning coalitions the number of simple games with n players is at most 22
n
, i.e.,
finite. Thus we have a finite intersection of half-spaces and a polyhedron, which is
a, possibly empty, polyhedron. It remains to remark that (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ PPLM(n,G)
to conclude the non-emptiness. 
Example 3. We consider P =
{=:P 1︷︸︸︷
Bzr ,
=:P 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
PGIr,
=:P 3︷︸︸︷
Sr
}
, G = W, and n = 7, i.e., the
class of weighted games with 7 players. For v = [2; 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] we have Bzr(v) =
(7, 5, . . . , 5) and PGIr(v) = Sr(v) = (1, 5, . . . , 5). The corresponding inequality (2)
for game v and players 1, 2 is given by α1 · (7− 5) + α2 · (1− 5) + α3 · (1− 5) ≥ 0.
Inserting α2 + α3 = 1 − α1 yields 2α1 − 4(1 − α1) ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
α1 ≥ 23 . Thus for all α with α1 < 23 the convex combination Pα,P does not satisfy
local monotonicity. This means that the weight of the Banzhaf index in a convex
combination satisfying LM must be at least 23 , i.e., closer to the Banzhaf index than
to the two other indices, on the set of weighted games with 7 players.
Example 4. Again we consider P =
{=:P 1︷︸︸︷
Bzr ,
=:P 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
PGIr,
=:P 3︷︸︸︷
Sr
}
, G = W, and n = 7.
For v = [14; 9, 8, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2] we have Bzr(v) = (33, 31, 21, 7, 7, 7, 7), PGIr(v) =
(6, 9, 5, 7, 7, 7, 7), and Sr(v) = (1, 8, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4). The corresponding inequality (2)
for the game v and players 1, 2 is given by α1 ·(33−31)+α2 ·(6−9)+α3 ·(1−8) ≥ 0.
Inserting α1 = 1 − α2 + α3 yields α2 ≤ 25 − 95 · α3 after a short calculation. Thus
for all α with α2 >
2
5 − 95 · α3 the convex combination Pα,P does not satisfy local
monotonicity.
In Figure 1 we have depicted the two regions, where Pα,P does not satisfy LM
according to the weighted games of Example 3 and Example 4. The weight region,
including its border, is a superset of PPLM(7,W). Later on it will turn out it indeed
coincides with PPLM(7,W).
Focusing on the necessary impact of P 1 over the rest of the P j ’s, we define the
cost of local monotonicity cP(n,G) as the smallest value β such that Pα,P satisfies
LM on G for all α ∈ Sr with α1 ≥ β.
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Figure 1. Regions of Pα,{Bz
r,PGIr,Sr} which do not satisfy LM
for weighted games with n = 7 players.
Definition 14. Given the requirements of Definition 13, the cost of local mono-
tonicity is defined as
cP(n,G) = inf
{
β ∈ [0, 1] | Pα,Psatisfies LM on (n,G), ∀α ∈ Sr : α1 ≥ β
}
for r > 1, where (n,G) stands for the class of games G with at most n voters, and
cP(n,G) = 0 for r = 1.
Some examples may be derived from the previous section. For G = U, or more
generally G = F, and P = {Jo,DP} we have cP(n,G) = 0 for all n ∈ N, since the
DP index is local monotonic. Similarly, for G = U, or more generally G = F, and
P = {Bz, PGI} we have cP(n,G) = 0 for all n ∈ N.
From Example 3 we conclude c{Bzr,PGIr,Sr}(7,W) ≥ 23 . The game from Exam-
ple 4 gives the tighter inequality c{Bzr,PGIr,Sr}(7,W) ≥ 79 . Later on it will turn out
that we can replace the infimum in Definition 14 by a minimum. Next we remark
that dropping some of the power indices that do no satisfy LM does not increase
the cost of local monotonicity:
Lemma 3. Given the requirements of Definition 13, let P 1 ∈ P ′ ⊆ P be a subset,
then we have cP′(n,G) ≤ cP(n,G) for all n ∈ N>0.
Proof. For |P ′| = 1 the statement follows from cP(n,G) ≥ 0. For |P ′| > 1 we can
embed the elements of S|P′| in S|P| by choosing zero for the missing indices. 
Observation 1. Given the requirements of Definition 13, we have cP(n,G′) ≤
cP(n,G) for all G′ ⊆ G.
Under slight technical assumptions on the set of power indices and on G we have
monotonicity in the number of players:
Lemma 4. Given the requirements of Definition 13, assume that all P j’s are in-
variant for nulls and that G is closed under the addition of null players. Then we
have cP(n,G) ≤ cP(n+ 1,G) for all n ∈ N>0.
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Proof. Given an n-player game v ∈ G with Pα,P(v) = (p1, . . . , pn), we can
construct a game v′ ∈ G by adding a null player such that Pα,P(v′) = (p1, . . . , pn, 0).
Since Pα,P satisfies LM for v if and only if Pα,P satisfies LM for v′, the statement
follows. 
For collections of r = 2 power indices not only the set PPLM(n,G) is a polyhedron
but also its complement Sr\PPLM(n,G) since both sets are intervals. Thus we can
replace the infimum in Definition 14 by a minimum for all cases where r = 2. Next
we will show that the lower bounds from Lemma 3 for all subsets of cardinality two
are sufficient to determine the cost of local monotonicity in general:
Lemma 5. Given the requirements of Definition 13, we have
cP(n,G) = max
{
c{P 1,P j}(n,G) | 2 ≤ j ≤ r
}
.
Proof. From Lemma 3 we conclude cP(n,G) ≥ max
{
c{P 1,P j}(n,G) | 2 ≤ j ≤ r
}
.
W.l.o.g. we assume c{P 1,P j}(n,G) < 1 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ r. Let ei denote the ith unit
vector. With this define vj = e1 · c{P 1,P j}(n,G) + ej ·
(
1− c{P 1,P j}(n,G)
)
for all
2 ≤ j ≤ r. We have already observed that for r = 2 the infimum in the definition
of the cost of local monotonicity is indeed attained. Thus P vj ,P satisfies LM. Since
PPLM(n,G) ⊆ Sr is convex, the n − 1-dimensional simplex conv(e1, v2, . . . , vr) =: F
is contained in PPLM(n,G). Now let A be the closure of Sr\F, which is a polyhedron
too. Indeed, the vertices of A are given by v2, . . . , vr and e2, . . . , er.
With this we have cP(n,G) ≤ max{a1 | (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ A}, where the maximum is
attained at one of the 2r−2 vertices of A. For the vertices e2, . . . , er the respective
a1-value is zero. By definition the a1-value of vj is given by c{P 1,P j} for all 2 ≤ j ≤
r. Thus, cP(n,G) ≤ max
{
c{P 1,P j}(n,G) | 2 ≤ j ≤ r
}
. 
Corollary 3.
cP(n,G) = min
{
β ∈ R≥0 | Pα,P satisfies LM on G∀α ∈ Sr : α1 ≥ β
}
So, in order to determine cP(n,G) it suffices to determine c{P 1,Ph}(n,G) for
all 2 ≤ h ≤ r. Given a game v ∈ G and two players i, j ∈ N with i A j,
we can solve Inequality (2) for α1 using α1 + αh = 1 If P
h violates LM for v
and players i, j, we obtain an inequality of the form α1 ≥ u and can conclude
c{P 1,Ph}(n,G) ≥ u. ¿From Example 3 we conclude c(Bzr,PGIr)(7,W) ≥ 23 and from
Example 4 we conclude c(Bzr,PGIr)(7,W) ≥ 79 .
In order to obtain tight bounds for the cost of local monotonicity, we may simply
loop over all possible choices of v, i, and j. At the very least, we can partially restrict
the number of choices as follows: Assuming 1 A · · · A n the requirement i A j is
equivalent to i ≤ j. We remark that if Ph violates LM for v and players i, j and
there exists another player i < i′ < j, then LM is violated for v and at least one of
the pairs i, i′ or i′, j of players. Thus, we can restrict our considerations on pairs of
players of the form i, i+ 1, where 1 ≤ i < n.
Lemma 6. Given the requirements of Definition 13 with r = 2, we have
c(P 1,P 2)(n,G) = max {li(v) | v ∈ G, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1} ,
where
li(v) :=
(
P 2i (v)− P 2i+1(v)
)
/
(
P 1i+1(v)− P 1i (v) + P 2i (v)− P 2i+1(v)
)
if P 1i+1(v)− P 1i (v) + P 2i (v)− P 2i+1(v) > 0 and li(v) := 0 otherwise.
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The big drawback of this exact approach is the usually large size of the set of n-
player games of G. Both sets of n-player complete simple or weighted games grow
faster than exponential. The exact numbers have been determined up to n = 9
only, see e.g. [24] for the numbers of complete and weighted games up to n = 8,
[13] for the number of complete games for n = 9, and [25, 29] for the number of
weighted games for n = 9. For n = 9 there are 284 432 730 174 complete simple
and 993 061 482 weighted games.1 Thus, using Lemma 6 becomes computationally
infeasible for n > 9. So we propose an integer linear programming formulation in
the next section.
5. An integer linear programming formulation
Whenever one is interested in complete simple games or weighted games, which are
extremal with respect to a certain criterion, exhaustive enumeration is not a feasible
option for n > 9 players, see the enumeration results stated at the end of the previ-
ous section. An alternative is to specify the set games indirectly by binary variables
and linear inequalities. If the extremality criterion can be also formulated using
integer variables and linear constraints, then integer linear programming techniques
can be applied. In the context of cooperative games this approach was introduced
in [26] and also applied in this context in e.g. [11, 27, 28].
For completeness, we briefly repeat the ILP formulation of a game v. Since v
is uniquely characterized by its values v(S) for all coalitions S ∈ 2N , we introduce
binary variables xS ∈ {0, 1} for all S ∈ 2N . The conditions for a simple game
can be stated as x∅ = 0, xN = 1, and xS ≤ xT for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . We remark
that for the later set of inequalities it suffices to consider the pairs of coalitions
where |T | = |S| + 1. Complete simple games can be modeled by additionally
requiring xS ≤ xT for all pairs of coalitions with ti A si for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where
S = {s1, . . . , sm} and T = {t1, . . . , tm}.
In order to restrict v to weighted games we additionally have to introduce weights
wi ≥ 0 and a quota q > 0, where we assume that the weight of each winning coalition
is larger than the weight of each losing coalition by at least one. (We may simply
use integer weights, which could result in harder problems for the ILP solver.) To
interlink the xS with the wi and q we use
q − (1− xS) ·M −
∑
i∈S
wi ≤ 0 ∀S ∈ 2N and
−xS ·M +
∑
i∈S
wi ≤ q − 1 ∀S ∈ 2N ,
where M is a suitably large constant fulfilling M − 1 ≥
n∑
i=1
wi. (We may choose
M = 4n
(
n+1
4
)(n+1)/2
, see [30, Theorem 9.3.2.1].)
The restrictions to proper games can be formulated via xS + xN\S ≤ 1 for all
S ⊆ N with |S| ≤ n2 . Similarly we can restrict to strong games by requesting
xS + xN\S ≥ 1. For constant sum games we need xS + xN\S = 1.
In order to compute the power distribution of Bzr, PGIr, and Sr from the xS , we
introduce further binary variables, cf. [27]. For i ∈ N and S ∈ 2N we set yi,S = 1
if and only if coalition S is a swing for player i and yi,S = 0 otherwise. This can
1which had to be slightly corrected recently [23].
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be ensured by requesting yi,S = 0 for i /∈ S and yi,S = xS − xS\{i} otherwise.
Similarly we introduce zS ∈ {0, 1}, where zS = 1 if and only if S is a minimal
winning coalition. This condition can be linearly reformulated as
zS − xS ≤ 0 ∀S ∈ 2N ,
zS + xS\{i} ≤ 1 ∀S ∈ 2N , i ∈ S, and
zS − xS +
∑
i∈S
xS\{i} ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ 2N .
In order to identify shift-minimal winning coalitions, we introduce binary variables
uS ∈ {0, 1} for all S ∈ 2N . In order to state characterizing linear constraints we
additionally need binary variables ti ∈ {0, 1} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, which are equal
to 0 if and only if players i and i + 1 are of the same type, i.e., i i + 1. This
equivalence can be ensured by requesting
xS∪{i} − xS∪{i+1} − ti ≤ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, S ⊆ N\{i, i+ 1} and
−ti +
∑
S⊆N\{i,i+1}
xS∪{i} − xS∪{i+1} ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
If ti = 0, i.e., i i + 1, then S ∪ {i} is a shift-minimal winning coalition if and
only if S ∪ {i+ 1} is a shift-minimal winning coalition, where S ⊆ N\{i, i+ 1} and
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. This conditioned equivalence can be expressed as
uS∪{i} ≥ uS∪{i+1} − ti and uS∪{i+1} ≥ uS∪{i} − ti.
So in the following we can restrict our considerations on coalitions S such that for
each i ∈ S we either have i = n, i+ 1 ∈ S or i A i+ 1.
Since each shift-minimal winning coalition has to be a minimal winning coalition,
we require uS ≤ zS for all S ∈ 2N . The other possibility disqualifying a coalition
S from being a shift-minimal winning coalition is the existence of player i ∈ S\{n}
with i+ 1 /∈ S and i A i+ 1 such that S ∪ {i+ 1}\{i} is winning. So we require
uS ≤ 1 + xS − xS∪{i+1}\{i} − ti
for all S ⊆ N , n 6= i ∈ S and i + 1 /∈ S. Since xS ≥ xS∪{i+1}\{i} the right hand
side is at least zero. So let us assume ti = 1. Since uS ≤ zS ≤ xS it suffices to
consider the cases where xS = 1. If xS∪{i+1}\{i} = 1 then the stated inequality is
trivially true. Just in the single case, where xS = 1, xS∪{i+1}\{i} = 0, and ti = 1,
it implies uS = 0.
By now we can guarantee that uS = 0 if S is not a shift-minimal winning
coalition. However uS = 0 is still feasible for shift-minimal winning coalitions. So,
we additionally require
uS − xS +
∑
i∈N\{n}:i∈S,i+1/∈S
xS∪{i+1}\{i} ≥ 0
for all S ⊆ N\n and
uS − xS + xS\{n} +
∑
i∈N\{n}:i∈S,i+1/∈S
xS∪{i+1}\{i} ≥ 0
for all {n} ⊆ S ⊆ N . If xS = 0 or one of the xS∪{i+1}\{i} = 1, then the proposed
inequality is trivially satisfied. So we assume otherwise. In the cases where n ∈ S
we can similarly assume xS\{n} = 0. In this remaining case we have the implication
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uS = 1, which is correct since no certificate for not being a shift-minimal winning
coalition exists, so that S is a shift-minimal winning coalition.
Finally consider the case where S indeed is a shift-minimal winning coalition.
Thus xS = 1. Remember that we need the implication uS ≥ 1 just for the coalitions
S, where for each player i ∈ S we either have i = n, i+ 1 ∈ S, or i A i+ 1. So we
can assume i A i+ 1 for all indices i in the summation. Thus xS∪{i+1}\{i} = 0. If
n ∈ S, then also xS\{n} = 0 since S is a minimal winning coalition.
Having these variables at hand, we can easily compute the following power in-
dices:
Bzri (v) =
∑
S⊆N
yi,S ,
PGIri (v) =
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
zS ,
Sri (v) =
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
uS ,
DPri (v) =
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
1
|S| · zS , and
SDPri (v) =
∑
{i}⊆S⊆N
1
|S| · uS .
For the Johnston index we have to take care that only the swing players obtain
an equal share for each coalition. To this end we introduce the continuous variables
bi,S ∈ R≥0 for all i ∈ N and and all S ∈ 2N , cf. [27]:
bi,S ≤ yi,S ∀S ∈ 2N , i ∈ N
bi,S − bjS ≥ yi,S + yj,S − 2 ∀S ∈ 2N , i, j ∈ N
n∑
i=1
bi,S ≤ 1 ∀S ∈ 2N
n∑
j=1
bi,S ≥ yi,S ∀S ∈ 2N , i ∈ N.
Given an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N , we can easily check that ∑ni=1 bi,S = 0 if S
is not a swing coalition for any player i ∈ N and ∑ni=1 bi,S = 1 otherwise. In the
later case we have bi,S = 0 whenever player i is not a swing for coalition S. The
second set of inequalities guarantees bi,S = bj,S whenever both i and j are swings
for coalition S. So we can state
Jori (v) =
∑
S⊆N
bi,S .
As a target we maximize
Pα,Pi+1 (v)− Pα,Pi (v) =
r∑
h=1
αhP
h
i+1(v)− αhPhi (v),
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where 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 has to be specified as a parameter. By looping over all possible
values of i we can decide whether Pα,P satisfies LM for a given α ∈ Sr.
Lemma 7. For P ⊆ {Bzr,PGIr,Sr, Jor,DPr,SDPr}, r := |P|, and α ∈ Sr, one
can decide α ∈ PPLM(n,G) if incidence vectors of the n-player games in G form a
polyhedron.
To be more precise, we have explicitly stated ILP formulations for the classes
of games G ∈ {S,C,W,Sp,Cp,Wp,Ss,Cs,Ws,Sc,Cc,Wc}. Having the binary
variables ti at hand restrictions on the number of equivalence classes of players or
even the precise partition can be formulated easily. ILP formulations for further
power indices can be found in [27].
We assume that the algorithm behind Lemma 7 gives either the answer yes, if
all corresponding n − 1 ILPs have an optimal target value of zero, or gives the
answer no together with a game v ∈ G and an index 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 such that Pα,P
violates LM for the game v and players i, i+ 1. The following algorithm computes
the cost of local monotonicity for convex combinations of two power indices, i.e.,
P = {P 1, Ph}:
α1 = 0
αh = 1
go on = true
while go on = true do
go on = false
for i from 1 to n− 1 do
if maxα1P
1
i+1(v)− α1P 1i (v) + αhPhi+1(v)− αhPhi (v) > 0 then
go on = true
choose v? ∈ arg maxα1P 1i+1(v)− α1P 1i (v) + αhPhi+1(v)− αhPhi (v) > 0
determine β with β
(
P 1i+1(v
?)− P 1i (v?)
)
+(1−β) (Phi+1(v?)− Phi (v?)) =
0
α1 = β
αh = 1− β
end if
end for
end while
6. Exact values and lower bounds for the cost of local
monotonicity
By considering parametric examples we can obtain general lower bounds for the
cost of local monotonicity.
Lemma 8. For P = (Bzr,PGIr) and n ≥ 2 we have cP(n,W) ≥ max
(
0, n−3n−1
)
.
Proof. Since cP(n,W) ≥ 0 by definition, it suffices to consider weighted games
with n ≥ 4 players. For the weighted game v = [2; 2, 1, . . . , 1], with n− 1 players of
weight 1 and one player of weight 2, the minimal winning coalitions are given by {1}
and {i, j}, where 2 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Thus, we have PGIr1(v) = 1 and PGIr2(v) = n− 2.
For player 1 the swing coalitions are given by {1} and {1, i} for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Given
a player j ≥ 2 the swing coalitions for player j are given by {i, j} for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n,
with i 6= j. Thus, we have Bzr1(v) = n and Bzr2(v) = n− 2.
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For players 1, 2 and game v Inequality (2) reads
α1 · Bzr1(v) + α2 · PGIr1(v) ≥ α1 · Bzr2(v) + α2 · PGIr2(v),
which is equivalent to
α1 · n+ α2 · 1 ≥ α1 · (n− 2) + α2 · (n− 2) ⇐⇒ α1 ≥ n− 3
n− 1 ,
since α1 + α2 = 1. 
Corollary 4. For P = (Bzr,Sr) and n ≥ 2 we have cP(n,W) ≥ max
(
0, n−3n−1
)
.
Proof. Since all minimal winning coalitions in the example of the proof of
Lemma 8 are also shift-minimal winning, we can apply the same proof for the
Shift index. 
So, from Lemma 8, Corollary 4, and Lemma 5 we can conclude that the cost of
local monotonicity is at least n−3n−1 for P = (Bzr,PGIr,Sr) and all n ≥ 2.
Corollary 5.
lim
n→∞ c(Bz
r,PGIr)(n,W) = lim
n→∞ c(Bz
r,Sr)(n,W) = lim
n→∞ c(Bz
r,PGIr,Sr)(n,W) = 1
In other words, the only convex combination of Bzr, PGIr, and Sr that is locally
monotonic for all weighted games is the raw Banzhaf index itself. For a finite
number of players it may still be possible that is cost of local monotonicity is
strictly less than 1.
Having the ILP approach from the previous section at hand we can also determine
the exact value of the cost of local monotonicity for a small number of players. It
turns out that the lower bound from Lemma 8 is tight for all n ≤ 10. So, especially
for n ≤ 3 we have a cost of local monotonicity of zero, which goes in line with the
fact that all weighted games with at most 3 players are locally monotonic. Although
the ILP approach can move the computational limit of exhaustive enumeration a
bit, it is so far limited to n ≤ 10. Since we were not able to find worser examples,
we state:
Conjecture 1. For P = (Bzr,PGIr) and n ≥ 2 we have cP(n,W) = max
(
0, n−3n−1
)
.
We remark that the extremal examples are not unique, e.g., we have the weighted
games [4; 4, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1], [10; 10, 8, 5, 4, 4, 3, 3, 2] and [7; 7, 6, 6, 6, 5, 3, 3, 3, 2, 1] also meet-
ing the bound from Lemma 8 for n = 6, n = 8, and n = 10, respectively. The respec-
tive Banzhaf scores are given by (11, 9, 5, 5, 3, 3), (28, 26, 16, 12, 12, 10, 10, 6), and
(24, 22, 22, 22, 20, 12, 12, 12, 8, 6). The respective PGI scores are given by (1, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3),
(1, 6, 11, 9, 9, 8, 8, 6), and (1, 8, 8, 8, 7, 9, 9, 9, 7, 6).
For combinations of the Banzhaf score and the Shift score the lower bound of
Corollary 4 is tight for n ≤ 6. For 7 ≤ n ≤ 11 we were able to computationally find
worser examples.
Lemma 9. Let P = (Bzr,Sr).
(1) For n = 7 we have cP(n,W) = 79 ≈ 0.77777.
(2) For n = 8 we have cP(n,W) = 78 = 0.875.
(3) For n = 9 we have cP(n,W) = 2527 ≈ 0.92593.
(4) For n = 10 we have cP(n,W) = 5153 ≈ 0.96226.
(5) For n = 11 we have cP(n,W) = 9799 ≈ 0.97980.
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(6) For n = 12 we have cP(n,W) ≥ 175177 ≈ 0.98870.
Proof. For the lower bounds we state an explicit weighted game and the Banzhaf
and the Shift score for the first two players:
(1) [14; 9, 8, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2], Bzr = (33, 31, . . . ), Sr = (1, 8, . . . );
(2) [16; 11, 10, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2], Bzr = (65, 63, . . . ), Sr = (1, 15, . . . );
(3) [30; 16, 15, 7, 7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3], Bzr = (129, 127, . . . ), Sr = (2, 27, . . . ),
[18; 13, 12, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2], Bzr = (129, 127, . . . ), Sr = (1, 26, . . . );
(4) [33; 19, 18, 7, 7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3], Bzr = (257, 255, . . . ), Sr = (2, 53, . . . );
(5) [36; 22, 21, 7, 7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3], Bzr = (513, 511, . . . ), Sr = (2, 99, . . . ).
(6) [56; 29, 28, 9, 9, 9, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4], Bzr = (1025, 1023, . . . ), Sr = (2, 177, . . . ).
For the upper bounds we have applied the ILP approach. 
In some cases we have already stated different tight examples. We would high-
light just another tight example, where the bound is met between the second and the
third player, for n = 9: [8; 5, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2] with Banzhaf score (85, 43, 41, 41, 41, 41, 41, 41, 41)
and Shift score (22, 1, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26, 26).
We provide a general construction meeting the best known examples for all n ≥ 6:
Lemma 10. Let k ≥ 1 be an integer, m ∈ {0, 1, 2}, n = 3k + 3 +m, and
v =
[
2t+m(k+1); t+1+m(k+1), t+m(k+1),
k times︷ ︸︸ ︷
2k + 3, . . . , 2k + 3,
2k+1+m times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k + 1, . . . , k + 1
]
,
where t = 2k2 + 3k + 1. With this, v is a weighted game consisting of n players,
Bzr1(v) = 2
n−2 + 1, Bzr2(v) = 2
n−2 − 1, Sr1(v) = 1 for k = 1, Sr1(v) = 2 for k > 1,
and
Sr2(v) = −1 + Sr1(v) +
k∑
a=0
∑
b=d t−a(2k+3)k+1 e
(
k
a
)
·
(
2k + 1 +m
b
)
.
Proof. We can easily check that v consists of n = 3k + 3 + m players having 4
different non-negative weights. For the ease of notation we denote coalition types
as a 4-tuple (c1, c2, c3, c4) meaning a coalition having 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 1 players of weight
t+ 1 +m(k + 1), 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1 players of weight t+m(k + 1), 0 ≤ c3 ≤ k players of
weight 2k + 3, and 0 ≤ c4 ≤ 2k + 1 +m players of weight k + 1. Due to symmetry
it suffices to know the counts c1, . . . , c4 instead of the precise coalitions.
Note that the sum of weights of the players of weight 2k + 3 is given by t − 1.
The sum of weights of players of weight k + 1 is given by t + m(k + 1). Next we
show that the players of the 4 weight types are non-equivalent. Since (1, 1, 0, 0) is
winning and (1, 0, 1, 0) is losing, the player of weight t+m(k+ 1) is non-equivalent
to players of weight 2k+3. Since (1, 0, k, 0) and winning and (0, 1, k, 0) is losing the
first two players are non-equivalent. Since (1, 0, k, 0) and winning and (1, 0, 0, k)
is losing, also the players of weight 2k + 3 are non-equivalent to players of weight
k + 1. Due to the decreasing sequence of weights, we have four equivalence classes
of players coinciding with the sets of players that have an equal weight.
A coalition type (1, 1, a, b) corresponds to swing coalitions for player 1 if and
only if a(2k+3)+b(k+1) ≤ t−1. Similarly, a coalition type (1, 0, a, b) corresponds
to swing coalitions for player 1 if and only if a(2k + 3) + b(k + 1) ≥ t − 1. So we
are interest in the number of cases where a(2k+ 3) + b(k+ 1) = t− 1. Considering
this equation modulo k + 1 yields a ≡ −1 (mod k) + 1, so that a = k, b = 0 is the
unique solution. Thus we have Bzr1(v) = 2
n−2 + 1.
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A coalition type (1, 1, a, b) corresponds to swing coalitions for player 2 if and
only if a(2k + 3) + b(k + 1) ≤ t − 2 and a coalition type (0, 1, a, b) corresponds to
swing coalitions for player 2 if and only if a(2k + 3) + b(k + 1) ≥ t. Thus we have
Bzr1(v) = 2
n−2 − 1.
The coalition {1, 2} is a minimal winning coalition in any case. We can easily
check that it is shift-minimal winning if and only if k > 1. Since the weight of
(1, 0, k, 0) exactly equals the quota, the corresponding unique coalition is shift-
minimal in any case. Now assume that a coalition S of type (1, 0, a, b) is shift-
minimal winning. Since S has to be winning, we have a(2k+ 3) + b(k+ 1) ≥ t− 1.
Since (0, 1, a, b) has to be losing, we have a(2k+3)+b(k+1) = t−1. As mentioned
before, the unique solution of this equation is given by a = k and b = 0. Thus, we
have Sr1(v) = 1 for k = 1 and S
r
1(v) = 2 for k > 1.
Every minimal winning coalition besides {1, 2} containing player 2 has to be
of type (0, 1, a, b). For any 0 ≤ a ≤ k the unique value for b is given by b(a) =⌈
t−a(2k+3)
k+1
⌉
, where 1 ≤ b ≤ 2k + 1. Since 2k + 3 > 2 · (k + 1) we have b(a) + 1 <
b(a− 1), i.e., the corresponding coalitions are shift-minimal winning. Counting the
number of coalitions of type (0, 1, a, b(a)) gives
Sr2(v) = −1 + Sr1(v) +
k∑
a=0
∑
b=d t−a(2k+3)k+1 e
(
k
a
)
·
(
2k + 1 +m
b
)
.

Of course one may speculate whether the stated construction is tight in general. At
the very least we can conclude that cP(n,W) tends at least exponentially to 1, i.e.,
there are constants d1 > 0, d2 > 1 with cP(n,W) ≥ 1− d1 · d−n2 , for P = (Bzr,Sr).
Conjecture 1 on the other hand would imply only a linear convergence rate. So,
in some sense, the Shift index is even less locally monotonic than the Public Good
index.
Next we go on and consider restrictions of the class of weighted games.
Lemma 11. For P = (Bzr,PGIr) and n ≥ 3 we have cP(n,Wp) ≥ max
(
0, n−4n−2
)
.
Proof. Since cP(n,W) ≥ 0 by definition, it suffices to consider weighted games
with n ≥ 5 players. We consider the weighted game v = [2n − 3;n − 1, n − 2, n −
2, 1, . . . , 1] with n− 3 players of weight 1, two players of weight n− 2 > 1 and one
player of weight n − 1. Since the sum of voting weights is 4n − 8 < 2 · (2n − 3),
the game is proper. The minimal winning coalitions are given by {1, 2}, {1, 3},
and {2, 3, i} for all 4 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, we have PGIr(v) = (2, n − 2, n − 2, 1, . . . , 1).
The swing coalitions for player 1 are given by {1, 2, 3} and all coalitions of the form
{1, i}∪S, where i ∈ {2, 3} and S ⊆ {4, . . . , n}. The swing coalitions for player 2 are
given by {1, 2} and all coalitions of the form {2, 3} ∪ S, where ∅ 6= S ⊆ {4, . . . , n}.
The unique swing coalition for a player i ≥ 4 is given by {2, 3, i}. Thus, we have
Bzr(v) =
(
2n−2 + 1, 2n−2 − 1, 2n−2 − 1, 1, . . . , 1).
For players 1, 2 and game v Inequality (2) is equivalent to 2α1 ≥ α1 · Bzr2(v) +
(n− 4)α2. Inserting α1 + α2 = 1 yields α1 ≥ n−4n−2 . 
Corollary 6. For P = (Bzr,Sr) and n ≥ 3 we have cP(n,Wp) ≥ max
(
0, n−4n−2
)
.
Using the ILP approach we can verify that Lemma 11 is tight for n ≤ 10 and
Corollary 6 is tight for n ≤ 6.
20 JOSEP FREIXAS AND SASCHA KURZ
Lemma 12. Let P = (Bzr,Sr).
(1) For n = 7 we have cP(n,Wp) = 57 ≈ 0.71429.
(2) For n = 8 we have cP(n,Wp) = 1113 ≈ 0.84615.
(3) For n = 9 we have cP(n,Wp) = 1213 ≈ 0.92308.
(4) For n = 10 we have cP(n,Wp) = 2122 ≈ 0.95455.
(5) For n = 11 we have cP(n,Wp) = 8385 ≈ 0.97647.
Proof. For the lower bounds we state an explicit weighted game and the Banzhaf
and the Shift score for the first two players:
(1) [21; 11, 10, 5, 5, 3, 3, 3], Bzr = (33, 31, . . . ), Sr = (2, 7, . . . );
(2) [25; 13, 12, 5, 5, 3, 3, 3, 3], Bzr = (65, 63, . . . ), Sr = (2, 13, . . . );
(3) [31; 16, 15, 7, 7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3], Bzr = (129, 127, . . . ), Sr = (2, 26, . . . );
(4) [39; 12, 11, 9, 9, 9, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5], Bzr = (194, 192, . . . ), Sr = (1, 45, . . . );
(5) [32; 8, 7, 7, 7, 7, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4], Bzr = (324, 322, . . . ), Sr = (1, 84, . . . ).
For the upper bounds we have applied the ILP approach. 
Since the parametric example from Lemma 8 and the examples from Lemma 9
and Lemma 10 have the property that the sum of weights meets or exceeds twice
the quota, the respective games are all strong. Thus, the same results are valid if
we restrict the class of weighted games to weighted strong games. Clearly we also
conjecture cP(n,Ws) = max
(
0, n−3n−1
)
for all n ≥ 2, where P = (Bzr,PGIr), which
is a weakening of Conjecture 1.
Since the parametric example from Lemma 11 and the examples from Lemma 12
are not strong, the cost of local monotonicity may decrease for constant sum
weighted games compared to proper weighted games.
If the class of weighted games is restricted to constant-sum games, then the non-
monotonicity is generally reduced, i.e. a lower contribution of the Banzhaf score
is sufficient to guarantee monotonicity of the power index obtained as a convex
combination.
Lemma 13. For P = (Bzr,PGIr) and n ≥ 2 we have cP(n,Wc) ≥ max
(
0, n−5n−1
)
.
Proof. Since cP(n,W) ≥ 0 by definition, it suffices to consider weighted games
with n ≥ 6 players. For the weighted game v = [2n− 5;n− 2, n− 3, n− 3, 1 . . . , 1],
with n− 3 players of weight 1, the minimal winning coalitions are given by {1, 2},
{1, 3}, {1, 4, 5, . . . , n}, and {2, 3, i} , where 4 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, we have PGIS1(v) = 3
and PGIS2(v) = n − 2. For player 1 the swing coalitions are given by {1, 2, 3},
{1, 4, 5, . . . , n}, and {1, 2} ∪S, {1, 3} ∪S, where S ⊆ {4, 5, . . . , n}. For player 2 the
swing coalitions are given by {1, 2} ∪ U , where U ⊆ {4, 5, . . . , n} with |U | < n− 3,
and {2, 3} ∪ V , where ∅ 6= V ⊆ {4, 5, . . . , n}. Thus, we have BZS1(v) = 2n−2 + 2
and BZS2(v) = 2
n−2 − 2.
For players 1, 2 and game v Inequality (2) is equivalent to 4α1 ≥ α1 · Bzr2(v) +
(n− 5)α2. Inserting α1 + α2 = 1 yields α1 ≥ n−5n−1 . 
Corollary 7. For P = (Bzr,Sr) and n ≥ 2 we have cP(n,Wc) ≥ max
(
0, n−5n−1
)
.
Corollary 8.
lim
n→∞ c(Bz
r,PGIr)(n,W
c) = lim
n→∞ c(Bz
r,Sr)(n,W
c) = lim
n→∞ c(Bz
r,PGIr,Sr)(n,W
c) = 1
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Using the ILP approach we can verify that Lemma 13 is tight for n ≤ 11 and
Corollary 7 is tight for n ≤ 7.
Lemma 14. Let P = (Bzr,Sr).
(1) For n = 8 we have cP(n,Wc) = 23 ≈ 0.66667.
(2) For n = 9 we have cP(n,Wc) = 2327 ≈ 0.85185.
(3) For n = 10 we have cP(n,Wc) = 4347 ≈ 0.91489.
(4) For n = 11 we have cP(n,Wc) = 7579 ≈ 0.94937.
Proof. For the lower bounds we state an explicit weighted game and the Banzhaf
and the Shift score for the first two players:
(1) [17; 9, 8, 5, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2], Bzr = (66, 62, . . . ), Sr = (3, 11, . . . );
(2) [21; 11, 10, 5, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2], Bzr = (130, 126, . . . ), Sr = (3, 26, . . . );
(3) [21; 6, 5, 5, 5, 5, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3], Bzr = (170, 166, . . . ), Sr = (5, 48, . . . );
(4) [22; 8, 7, 7, 7, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2], Bzr = (386, 382, . . . ), Sr = (4, 79, . . . ).
For the upper bounds we have applied the ILP approach. 
Similar results can be obtained for Jor, DPr, and SDPr.
Lemma 15. Let P = (Jor,DPr).
(1) For n ≤ 4 we have cP(n,W) = 0.
(2) For n = 5 we have cP(n,W) = 18 = 0.125.
(3) For n = 6 we have cP(n,W) = 14 = 0.25.
(4) For n = 7 we have cP(n,W) = 13 ≈ 0.33333.
(5) For n = 8 we have cP(n,W) = 25 = 0.4.
(6) For n = 9 we have cP(n,W) ≥ 1125 = 0.44.
(7) For n = 10 we have cP(n,W) ≥ 12 = 0.5.
Proof. For the lower bounds we state an explicit weighted game, the Johnston
and the Deegan-Packel score, where we highlight the values of the critical players:
(2) [3; 3, 2, 2, 1, 1], Jor = (6, 52 ,
5
2 , 1, 1), SDP
r = (1, 32 ,
3
2 , 1, 1);
(3) [8; 4, 4, 3, 1, 1, 1], Jor = ( 152 ,
15
2 ,6,
2
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 ), SDP
r = ( 32 ,
3
2 ,2,
2
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 );
(4) [9; 5, 4, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2], Jor = ( 703 ,
28
3 ,
23
3 ,
19
6 ,
19
6 ,
19
6 ,
19
6 ),
SDPr = ( 236 ,
17
6 ,
11
3 ,
19
6 ,
19
6 ,
19
6 ,
19
6 );
(5) [12; 4, 4, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3], Jor = ( 192 ,
19
2 ,
19
2 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 ),
SDPr = ( 476 ,
47
6 ,
47
6 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 ,
17
2 );
(6) [20; 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4], Jor = ( 192 , . . . ,
19
2 ,
69
5 , . . . ,
69
5 ),
SDPr = ( 534 , . . . ,
53
4 ,
69
5 , . . . ,
69
5 );
(7) [20; 5, 5, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4], Jor = ( 1034 , . . . ,
103
4 ,25, . . . , 25),
SDPr = ( 974 , . . . ,
97
4 ,25, . . . , 25);
For the upper bounds we have applied the ILP approach. 
For P = (Jor,DPr) the cost of local monotonicity seems to be increasing rather
slowly. Given the numerical data from Lemma 15 it is not clear at all whether
cP(n,W) tends to 1 as n tends to infinity. To this end we consider the following
construction for a odd number of players:
Lemma 16. For k ≥ 1 and v = [k(k + 1),
k times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k + 1, . . . , k + 1,
k+1 times︷ ︸︸ ︷
k, . . . , k ] we have
Jori (v) = c(k) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Jori (v) = d(k) for all k + 1 ≤ 2k + 1, DPri (v) =
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c(k)− k+1k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and DPri (v) = d(k) for all k + 1 ≤ 2k + 1, where
c(k) =
k + 2
k
+
1
k + 1
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i− 1
)
·
(
k + 1
i
)
and
d(k) =
1
k + 1
+
1
k + 1
·
k−1∑
i=1
(
k
i
)2
.
Proof. We can easily check that v consists of n = 2k + 1 players having two
different weights. As in the proof of Lemma 10 we use a 2-tuple (c1, c2) to describe
the type of a coalition. Since the coalitions of type (k, 0) are winning but the
coalitions of type (0, k) are losing, no player of weight k+1 is equivalent to a player
of weight k.
In coalitions of type (k, 0) or type (k, 1) all players of weight k + 1 are swing
players, while the players of weight k are not swing players. The other types of
coalitions which contain a least one swing player are given by (i, k + 1− i), where
0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1. In these cases all involved k + 1 players are swings. Counting the
number of cases, where player 1 is contained, for each of the mentioned coalition
types gives
Jor1(v) =
(
k − 1
k − 1
)
·
(
k + 1
0
)
· 1
k
+
(
k − 1
k − 1
)
·
(
k + 1
1
)
· 1
k
+
1
k + 1
·
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i− 1
)
·
(
k + 1
i
)
= c(k)
Counting the number of cases, where player n is contained, for each of the mentioned
coalition types gives
Jorn(v) =
1
k + 1
+
1
k + 1
·
k−1∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
·
(
k
i
)
= d(k).
All coalition types except (k, 1) correspond to minimal winning coalitions. Thus we
have DPr1(v) = Jo
r
1(v)−
(
k−1
k−1
) ·(k+11 ) · 1k = c(k)− k+1k and DPrn(v) = Jorn(v) = d(k).
The values for the remaining players follow from symmetry. 
Corollary 9. For P = (Jor,DPr) and n ≥ 1 we have cP(n,W) ≥ 1 − 2(3n−2)n2 ≥
1− 6n .
Proof. For the weighted game from Lemma 16 Inequality (2) yields cP(2k +
1,W) ≥ 1− kk+1 · (c(k)− d(k)). Since
∑k−1
i=1
(
k−1
i−1
) · (k+1i )−∑k−1i=1 (ki)2 = −(k − 1),
we have c(k)− d(k) = 3k+2k(k+1) . Thus cP(2k+ 1,W) ≥ 1− 3k+2(k+1)2 . Since cP(n,W) ≥
cP(n− 1,W) we can choose k =
⌈
n−2
2
⌉
and obtain the stated lower bounds. 
Corollary 10. For P = (Jor,DPr) we have lim
n→∞ cP(n,W) = 1.
Lemma 17. Let P = (Jor,SDPr).
(1) For n ≤ 4 we have cP(n,W) = 0.
(2) For n = 5 we have cP(n,W) = 13 ≈ 0.33333.
(3) For n = 6 we have cP(n,W) = 35 = 0.6.
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(4) For n = 7 we have cP(n,W) = 79 ≈ 0.77778.
(5) For n = 8 we have cP(n,W) = 4753 ≈ 0.88679.
(6) For n = 9 we have cP(n,W) ≥ 2931 ≈ 0.93548.
Proof. For the lower bounds we state an explicit weighted game and the Johnston
and the Shift Deegan-Packel score for the last two players:
(2) [4; 3, 3, 2, 2, 1], Jor = (. . . , 2, 1), SDPr = (. . . , 12 , 1);
(3) [8; 4, 4, 3, 3, 2, 1], Jor = (. . . , 2, 43 ), SDP
r = (. . . , 13 ,
4
3 );
(4) [8; 5, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1], Jor = (. . . , 196 ,
8
3 ), S
r = (. . . , 1112 ,
8
3 );
(5) [15; 7, 7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2], Jor = (. . . , 8615 ,
16
3 ), SDP
r = (. . . , 115 ,
16
3 );
(6) [12; 7, 7, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1], Jor = (. . . , 476 ,
15
2 ), SDP
r = (. . . , 83 ,
15
2 ).
For the upper bounds we have applied the ILP approach. 
Quite obviously the cost of local monotonicity for P = (Jor,DPr) seems to
converge to 1 as n increases. An appropriate lower bound can be concluded from
the parametric example v = [2(n − 3);n − 2, n − 2, 2, . . . , 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−3 times
, 1], where n ≥ 5, by
considering the last two players. We remark that the exact value for n = 7 and the
lower bound for n = 9 is attained for this parametric family.
7. Determining the polyhedron PPLM(n,W) for convex combinations of
three power indices.
In the previous section we have computationally determined the cost of local mono-
tonicity for several sets of two or three power indices on subclasses of weighted
games. Now we want to gain even more information: Given a collection P of r ≥ 2
power indices, for which α ∈ Sr does Pα,P satisfy local monotonicity? In Section 4
we have obtained the result that the respective set PPLM(n,G) is a polyhedron. As
already discussed, each game v ∈ G gives a valid inequality for PPLM(n,G). Using
the ILP approach from Section 5 we can check whether a given point α ∈ Sr is con-
tained in PPLM(n,G). In the case where α is not contained in PPLM(n,G), we obtain
a game v ∈ G verifying this fact. So either we can verify vertices of our polyhedron
or compute additional non-redundant valid inequalities. So, instead of looping over
all games in G, we can use the following algorithm to determine PPLM(n,G):
P = Sr
compute the set A of vertices of P
for all α ∈ A do
verified(α) = false
end for while ∃α ∈ A with verified(α) = false do
if α ∈ PPLM(n,G) then
verified(α) = true
else
compute certifying game v ∈ G
add inequalities corresponding to v to P
compute the set A of vertices of P
set verified(α) = false for all new vertices
end if
end while
return P
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We remark that we may also include the information that (1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ PPLM(n,G)
in any case, i.e., one of the r vertices of Sr can be set to be verified. If already
determined, the r−1 examples for the cost of local monotonicity for P ′ = {P 1, P i}
can be used to replace the initialization of P, i.e., setting P = conv(e1, p2, . . . , pr),
where ei is the ith unit vector and pi = e1 · c{P 1,P i}(n,G) + ei · (1− c{P 1,P i}(n,G)).
Exemplarily, we have performed the computations forG = W, P = {Bzr,PGIr,Sr},
and n ≤ 9.
Lemma 18. For P = {Bzr,PGIr,Sr} we have
(1) PPLM(n,W) = S3 = conv {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)} for n ≤ 3;
(2) PPLM(4,W) = conv
{
(1, 0, 0), ( 13 ,
2
3 , 0), (
1
3 , 0,
2
3 )
}
;
(3) PPLM(5,W) = conv
{
(1, 0, 0), ( 12 ,
1
2 , 0), (
1
2 , 0,
1
2 )
}
;
(4) PPLM(6,W) = conv
{
(1, 0, 0), ( 35 ,
2
5 , 0), (
3
5 , 0,
2
5 )
}
;
(5) PPLM(7,W) = conv
{
(1, 0, 0), ( 23 ,
1
3 , 0), (
7
9 , 0,
2
9 ), (
2
3 ,
1
4 ,
1
12 )
}
;
(6) PPLM(8,W) = conv
{
(1, 0, 0), ( 57 ,
2
7 , 0), (
7
8 , 0,
1
8 ), (
5
7 ,
9
35 ,
1
35 )
}
;
(7) PPLM(9,W) = conv
{
(1, 0, 0), ( 34 ,
1
4 , 0), (
25
27 , 0,
2
27 ), (
3
4 ,
19
80 ,
1
80 )
}
.
In Figure 2 we have exemplarily drawn P{Bz
r,PGIr,Sr}
LM (7,W), which complements
the region drawn in Figure 1. In order to illustrate the proposed algorithm we
consider the case n = 9 as an example. For {Bzr,PGIr} the cost of local mono-
tonicity is given by 34 and e.g. attained at the game v1 = [2; 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
We have Bzr(v1) = (9, 7, . . . ), PGI
r(v1) = (1, 7, . . . ), and S
r(v1) = (1, 7, . . . ).
For {Bzr,Sr} the cost of local monotonicity is given by 2527 and e.g. attained at
the game v2 = [30; 16, 15, 7, 7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3]. We have Bz
r(v2) = (129, 127, . . . ),
PGIr(v2) = (23, 27, . . . ), and S
r(v2) = (2, 27, . . . ). The hyperplane correspond-
ing to v1 is given by 2α1 − 6α2 − 6α3 = 0 and the hyperplane corresponding to
v2 is given by 2α1 − 4α2 − 25α3. Together with α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 we obtain the
new vertex α′ =
(
3
4 ,
19
84 ,
1
42
)
. By using the ILP approach we can compute that
α′ does not lead to a locally monotonic power index and obtain the game v3 =
[18; 13, 12, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2] with Bzr(v3) = (129, 127, . . . ), PGI
r(v3) = (22, 27, . . . ),
and Sr(v3) = (1, 26, . . . ). For this game the corresponding hyperplane is given by
2α1 − 5α2 − 25α3. Again there arises exactly one new vertex – α′′ =
(
3
4 ,
19
80 ,
1
80
)
.
By using the ILP approach we can compute that α′′ is contained in PPLM(9,W), so
that the determination of the polyhedron is completed.
We remark that α′′ does also attain the cost of local monotonicity for {Bzr,Sr}.
So if we had started with the games v1 and v3 instead of v1 and v2, our algorithm
would have needed one iteration less.
8. Conclusion
We have introduced the concept of considering convex combinations of power in-
dices. Several of the main properties of power indices are preserved by convexity,
i.e., given a collection P of power indices such that each power index in P has a
certain property, then also every convex combination of the power indices in P has
this property. Lemma 1 gives some examples of such properties being preserved
by convexity. The freedom in choosing the multipliers almost arbitrarily enables
us to search for power indices, which satisfy some other useful properties. As an
application we study local monotonicity. It is well known that the Public Good
index does not satisfy local monotonicity, while e.g. the Banzhaf index does. So,
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Figure 2. PPLM(7,W) for P = {Bzr,PGIr,Sr}.
what proportion of the Banzhaf index is necessary so that a convex combination
of both indices becomes locally monotonic? The newly introduced cost of local
monotonicity answers this specific question. Similar measures may of course be
introduced for other properties of power indices.
It turns out that with an increasing number of players the weight of the Banzhaf
index needs to tend to 1. For a finite number of players there is still some freedom
to incorporate some information from the Public Good index, while maintaining
the local monotonicity of the Banzhaf index.
Restricting the class of the underlying games to strong or proper games typically
decreases the cost of local monotonicity, but does not change the general behavior.
The cost of local monotonicity for combinations of the Banzhaf and the Shift
index is considerably higher. So, in some sense the Shift index is even less locally
monotonic than the Public Good index. Going over to the so-called equal division
version of the Banzhaf-, Public Good-, and the Shift index, i.e., The Johnston-, the
Deegan-Packel and the Shift-Deegan Packel index, seems to generally lower the cost
of local monotonicity. Nevertheless, the corresponding cost of local monotonicity
approaches 1 as the number of players tends to infinity.
So, our study has shed some light on the property of local monotonicity of some
power indices. The methodology of considering convex combinations of power in-
dices in order to obtain some desirable properties is quite general and the presented
theoretical and algorithmic framework may be applied in further studies.
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